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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION-ALIENS' RIGHTS-
PARTICIPATION IN ASSISTANCE FUNDS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION-
STANDARD OF REVIEw-The Supreme Court of the United States
has held that a state statute denying resident aliens equal access
to higher education assistance funds will be subject to the strict
scrutiny standard of review even though the statute neither creates
a per se classification nor causes a denial of benefits essential for
economic survival.
Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
Two resident aliens of the State of New York, appellees Jean-
Marie Mauclet and Alan Rabinovitch,' applied for financial assis-
tance to pursue higher education within the state.' However, in
accordance with section 661(3) of New York's higher education laws
which restricted participation by aliens in educational assistance
funds, each was denied any assistance. 3 Seeking relief,' appellees
each brought suit in a New York federal district court against the
State of New York and those officials responsible for administering
assistance funds, alleging that the citizenship requirement was un-
constitutional. 5 The three-judge district court convened to hear the
1. Appellee Mauclet is a citizen of France, but has been a permanent resident of the
United States since November of 1969. He is married to a United States citizen, and has a
child by that marriage who is also a United States citizen. Appellee Rabinovitch is an
unmarried Canadian citizen who has lived in this country as a permanent resident alien since
1964. He registered with the Selective Service on his eighteenth birthday, and graduated from
the New York public school system. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1977).
2. New York provides financial assistance primarily in three forms. The first is the Re-
gents College Scholarship, awarded on the basis of performance in a competitive examina-
tion. A second form of aid is the tuition assistance award; these are noncompetitive and the
amount of the award is based upon both tuition and income. The state guaranteed student
loan is the third form of assistance. Id. at 2-3.
3. N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 661(3) (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978). Section 661(3) reads in relevant
part: "Citizenship. An applicant (a) must be a citizen of the United States, or (b) must have
made application to become a citizen, or (c) if not qualified for citizenship, must submit a
statement affirming an intent to apply as soon as eligible for citizenship .... " Mauclet
applied for the tuition assistance award, but his application was not processed because of his
refusal to apply for United States citizenship. Rabinovitch was informed that he qualified
for, and was entitled to, a Regents College Scholarship and tuition assistance award as the
result of a commendable performance on the Regents Qualifying Examinations. However,
Rabinovitch was later apprised that the scholarship offer was being withdrawn since he
intended to retain his Canadian citizenship. 432 U.S. at 4-5.
4. Both appellees sought a judgment declaring § 661(3) invalid, enjoining its enforcement,
and requiring the state to process the applications for assistance. Additionally, appellee
Rabinovitch requested damages for past monies withheld. Mauclet v. Nyquist, 406 F. Supp.
1233 (W.D.N.Y. 1976), affl'd, 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
5. Mauclet brought suit in the Federal District Court for the Western District of New
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case decided unanimously in the appellees' favor.' Applying a strict
scrutiny standard of review, the district court held that section
661(3) violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment in that the citizenship requirement discriminated unconstitu-
tionally against resident aliens.8 The district court concluded that
the alien-appellees had the same rights as citizens to state financial
assistance in New York' since the state had not demonstrated a
compelling interest justifying its discriminatory classification."° The
state appealed, and the United States Supreme Court noted proba-
ble jurisdiction."
A 5-4 majority of the Court," speaking through Justice Blackmun,
also utilized a strict scrutiny standard of review and affirmed the
decision of the district court in declaring the statute unconstitu-
tional.13 The Court began its analysis by disposing of the appel-
lants' 4 contention that the challenged statute should not be sub-
York, and Rabinovitch in the Eastern District, but the cases were consolidated because of
their factual similarity and heard by a three-judge court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970)
(repealed 90 Stat. 1119 (1976)), and 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1970) (amended 90 Stat. 1119 (1976)).
6. 406 F. Supp. 1233 (W.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
7. This strict standard of review is employed when the state legislation denies equal
protection of the law to a class that the United States Supreme Court has deemed "suspect",
or when it infringes upon a judicially recognized fundamental interest. Unlike the general
standard that a statutory classification is constitutionally valid as long as it is rationally
related to some legitimate state objective, strict scrutiny raises a strong presumption of
invalidity, and only the most precisely drawn legislation, exhibiting some compelling inter-
ests, will pass constitutional muster. See Examining Bd. of Eng'rs v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S.
572, 605 (1976) (Court held invalid a Puerto Rican statute that permitted only United States
citizens to practice privately as civil engineers). See also Comment, Constitutional Law:
Federal Economic Regulation of Alien Individuals-Looking for Equal Airspace in the Fifth
Amendment, 29 OKiA. L. Rav. 409 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Equal Airspace]. In 1971,
classifications based on alienage, like those based on race and nationality, were deemed
inherently suspect and therefore subject to strict judicial scrutiny. See Graham v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971).
8. 406 F. Supp. at 1236.
9. The Court granted the appellees' request for declaratory and injunctive relief, but held
that an award of money damages would be inappropriate. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1974) (eleventh amendment bars federal courts from ordering state officials to remit
benefits wrongfully withheld from eligible welfare applicants).
10. 406 F. Supp. at 1236. The court further expressed doubt as to whether the legislatively
drawn classification would survive even the rational basis test. But see note 31 and accompa-
nying text infra.
11. 429 U.S. 917 (1976).
12. The majority included Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and White.
Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Stewart dissented.
13. 432 U.S. at 12.
14. The appellants in the case were the various individuals and corporate entities respon-
sible for administering the state's educational assistance programs. Id. at 6.
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jected to a strict scrutiny standard of review because the statute did
not absolutely bar aliens from participating in educational assis-
tance funds." Relying on its 1971 decision of Graham v.
Richardson," the Court concluded that since the New York statute
in Mauclet, like the statute in Graham, was directed at aliens only,
and aliens alone were adversely affected, strict scrutiny application
was warranted. 7 The discriminatory effect of section 661(3) against
aliens as a class was not rendered inconsequential simply because
an absolute bar to the receipt of educational assistance was not
imposed."'
The Court also rejected the appellants' contention that there
were adequate policy justifications for upholding section 661(3)-
namely, that it was designed to offer an incentive for aliens to
become naturalized, and was tailored to enhance the educational
level of the electorate." Sugarman v. Dougall had implied in dic-
tum that in exceptional circumstances, a state's interest in estab-
lishing its own form of government and preserving its political com-
munity might justify some statutes with alienage-based classifica-
tions and permit such state legislation to withstand even a strict
scrutiny standard of review.' The majority in Mauclet observed,
however, that the broad justifications offered by the appellants for
section 661(3) swept far beyond the confines of the Sugarman excep-
15. Id. at 7-8. Section 661(3) permits aliens who have applied for citizenship, or, if not
qualified for it, who have filed a statement of intent to apply as soon as eligible, to participate
in the assistance programs. Thus, the appellants contended that the statute distinguished
"only within the 'heterogeneous' class of aliens" and "does not distinguish between citizens
and aliens vel non." See Brief for Appellants at 20, Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellants].
16. 403 U.S. 365 (1971). In Graham, the Court invalidated provisions of the Arizona
welfare laws that conditioned receipt of benefits upon citizenship and durational residency
requirements.
17. Graham held that "classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality
or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny." Id. at 371-72.
18. 432 U.S. at 9.
19. Id. at 10. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 15, at 22-25.
20. 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (New York civil service law which provided that only citizens
could hold permanent positions in the competitive class of state civil service held violative
of fourteenth amendment equal protection clause).
21. Id. at 647-48. This narrow exception enunciated in Sugarman is apparently confined
to establishing qualifications for persons holding state elective or important nonelective exec-
utive, legislative, and judicial positions. In fact, the Court has sustained only one state
statutory scheme under the Sugarman exception, and this subsequent to the Court's decision
in Mauclet. See Foley v. Connelie, 98 S.Ct. 1067 (1978) (New York statute limiting appoint-
ment of members of state police force to citizens of the United States did not violate the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment).
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tion.n If encouragement of naturalization was accepted as a sup-
porting rationale under the Sugarman exception, the majority be-
lieved that nearly any classification based on alienage could be
similarly justified, and the exception would swallow the rule.3 In
response to the second justification offered by the appellants, the
Court concluded that the state's alleged interest in educating the
electorate would hardly be frustrated by extending assistance to
resident aliens and providing resident aliens with the same educa-
tional opportunities provided to others.u Finally, aside from any
justification offered by the state for section 661(3), the Court rea-
soned that since aliens are under the same obligation as citizens to
pay their full share of taxes that support the assistance programs,
it would not be unfair to allow them to participate in programs to
which they contributed on an equal basis.5
Three separate dissenting opinions were written by members of
the Court who sharply disagreed with the majority's equal protec-
tion analysis.2 The dissenters maintained that since the New York
legislature had not statutorily drawn the line between aliens, as a
class, and citizens, but between aliens who chose to retain foreign
citizenship and all others, the scheme did not discriminate against
a suspect classY The dissents emphasized that the primary reason
aliens had previously been afforded the status of suspect classifica-
tion was because, as a class, they were an example of a discrete and
insular minority and identified by a status which they were power-
less to change until they became eligible for citizenship.2 Thus,
22. 432 U.S. at 11. The narrowness of the Sugarman exception is reflected in In re Grif-
fiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973), where the Court invalidated a state court rule limiting the practice
of law to citizens, despite a recognition of the vital public and political role of attorneys.
23. Id.
24. Id. Perhaps the Court's reasoning was colored by a suggestion that the number of
aliens disqualified by § 661(3) was exceedingly small, causing the inclusion of aliens in the
assistance programs to have an insubstantial impact on the cost of the programs. See id. at
n.15.
25. Id. In the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Burger, he states that "New York, like
most other States, does not have unlimited funds to provide its residents with higher educa-
tion services . . . . [N]othing heretofore found in the Constitution compels a State to apply
its finite resources to higher education of aliens who have demonstrated no permanent attach-
ment to the United States and who refuse to apply for citizenship." Id. at 14.
26. Justice Powell dissented in an opinion joined by Justice Stewart and Chief Justice
Burger. Justice Rehnquist's dissent was joined by Chief Justice Burger. The Chief Justice also
wrote a separate dissent.
27. 432 U.S. at 15 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 17-22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 15-16 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 17-22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. at 372 (aliens as a class are a prime example of a discrete
Vol. 16: 829
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aliens were afflicted by a disability that nothing except the passage
of time could remove. 9 Therefore, the dissenters postulated, since
the policy underlying the elevation of alienage classifications to the
suspect category ceased once the New York legislature classified
aliens in such a manner as to enable them to remove themselves
from the disabled class at any time, the application of the strict
scrutiny standard of review should also cease. 3 The dissenters then
concluded that the rational basis test should be applied, and under
that test the statute sustained, since the justifications offered by the
appellants were tailored to attain legitimate state objectives.3 1 Chief
Justice Burger noted a further critical distinction between Mauclet
and prior cases involving alienage-based classifications. Unlike
Mauclet, Burger observed, all prior cases upon which the majority
relied involved statutes that denied aliens an essential means of
economic survival or access to the necessities of life. 32
The Mauclet decision is the most recent development of the
Court's position regarding the degree of constitutional protection
guaranteed to aliens by the fourteenth amendment. Historically,
and insular minority for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate). The Court
first alluded to the term "discrete and insular minority" in United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
29. 432 U.S. at 17-22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Federal law generally requires five years
residence by aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence as a prerequisite to the seeking
of naturalization. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1970).
30. 432 U.S. at 15-16 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 17-22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Rehnquist had dissented in Sugarman and In re Griffiths on the basis that the fourteenth
amendment equal protection clause was not intended by the drafters to render alienage a
suspect classification. He was not yet a member of the Court when Graham was decided.
Whether or not Rehnquist is willing to accept an evisceration of the position he adopted in
Sugarman and In re Griffiths is not entirely clear. However, his basic proposition is that even
if the majority's premise in Graham, Sugarman, and In re Griffiths-that per se classifica-
tions are inherently suspect-is accepted, one can still consistently disagree with the majority
in Mauclet since no suspect class was created by the statute. The line drawn by the legislature
was not drawn on the basis of a status that the included members were powerless to alter,
nor were they categorized by a factor beyond their control.
31. 432 U.S. at 12-15 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 15-16 (Powell, J., dissenting); id.
at 17-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Burger observed that "[t]he line drawn by the State is
not a perfect one-7and few lines can be-but it does provide a rational means to further the
State's legitimate objectives." Id. at 14.
32. Id. at 12-13. See, e.g., Examining Bd. of Eng'rs v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976)
(Puerto Rican statute permitted only United States citizens to practice privately as civil
engineers); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (Connecticut law deprived resident aliens of
the right to take state bar examination); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (participa-
tion in New York's competitive civil service limited to citizens); Takahashie v. Fish and
Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (California statute prohibited the issuance of commercial
fishing licenses to resident aliens).
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although the Court had stated on several occasions that the equal
protection clause was intended to protect aliens, the scope of that
protection remained somewhat unclear." However, in 1971, the
landmark decision of Graham v. Richardson" spawned the genesis
for the expansion of aliens' rights by elevating alienage to the same
suspect class status as race35 and nationality."6 Since Graham, strict
scrutiny has consistently been utilized as the standard of review
when aliens have raised equal protection challenges to state legisla-
tion adversely affecting them.37 Therefore, at first glance, the major-
ity's conclusion that the result in Mauclet was mandated by the
Graham rationale appears meritorious. A closer analysis, however,
reveals a specious opinion in which the Court has actually substi-
tuted a wooden, mechanical application of equal protection juris-
prudence for a thorough and insightful equal protection analysis. 39
33. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (aliens are persons within the
meaning of the fourteenth amendment whose guarantees extend to all persons without regard
to difference of race, color, or nationality); Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S.
410 (1948) (the power of a state to apply its own laws exclusively to its alien inhabitants is
confined within narrow limits).
34. 403 U.S. 365 (1971). See note 16 supra.
35. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (equal protection clause demanded that
Virginia's miscegenation statutes, resting solely upon distinctions drawn according to race,
be subjected to the most rigid scrutiny).
36. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (California Alien Land Law held to deny
American citizen equal protection by discriminating solely on the basis of parent's country
of origin); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (distinctions between citizens
solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institu-
tions are founded upon the doctrine of equality).
37. See Examining Bd. of Eng'is-v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976) (state classifica-
tions based on alienage are subject to strict judicial scrutiny); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717
(1973) (classifications based on alienage, being inherently suspect, are subject to close judicial
scrutiny); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (citing Graham for the proposition that
classifications based on alienage are subject to close judicial scrutiny). But see Nowak,
Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited,
Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEO. L.J. 1071 (1974) (author suggests that al-
though the Court stated in Graham that it was using strict scrutiny because a suspect
classification was involved, the Court was actually using the "demonstrable basis" test, and
that this is the proper standard of review for classifications based on alienage) [hereinafter
cited as Nowak].
38. 432 U.S. at 8. (Graham v. Richardson undermines the appellants' position).
39. Perhaps this is attributable in part to the rigid two-tiered standard that currently
exists for reviewing equal protection challenges. Several commentators have suggested more
flexible, middle-ground alternatives to the existing rational basis and strict scrutiny stan-
dards of review. See, e.g., Coven & Fersh, Equal Protection, Social Welfare Litigation, The
Burger Court, 51 Noarmz Ds LAw. 873 (1976) (unitary approach) [hereinafter cited as Coven
& Fersh]; Nowak, supra note 37 (demonstrable basis test); Gunther, Foreword: In Search of
Vol. 16: 829
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The critical issue confronting the Court was whether a state may
ever create alienage-based classifications without automatically
subjecting the legislation to a strict scrutiny standard of review. The
majority's approach, bottomed on the application of prior case law,
precluded any consideration of whether section 661(3) had actually
created a suspect class that merited a strict scrutiny standard of
review. Since the statutorily created class involved aliens, the Court
simply reasoned that section 661(3) was therefore facially subject to
a strict scrutiny reviewing standard, found no compelling state in-
terests,40 and inevitably invalidated the statute.4'
A critical reading of Mauclet reveals that the majority's reliance
upon prior case law was unfounded and that the prior case law
should not have been dispositive of the issue here. An exegesis of the
Court's prior decisions in this area discloses that the state legisla-
tion challenged in each case suffered from two distinct infirmities
that justified the application of strict scrutiny. First, every previous
statute invalidated by the Court either impaired an alien's ability
to earn a livelihood by prohibiting engagement in certain occupa-
tions or professions,'2 or resulted in a denial of benefits essential for
human sustenance. 3 More importantly, however, each previously
invalidated statute discriminated against aliens as a class, and left
resident aliens afflicted with a disability that nothing except the
passage of time could remove." The statute in Mauclet suffers from
neither infirmity, 5 since it imposed neither a citizenship require-
ment nor a durational residency requirement as a prerequisite to the
receipt of educational assistance funds, and it consequently appears
that strict scrutiny should have been inapplicable.
The application of strict scrutiny to alienage classifications pres-
ents a unique problem because the underlying reason for elevating
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV.
L. REv. 1 (1972) (means-oriented review) [hereinafter cited as Gunther].
40. The Court, however, has not required the federal government to exhibit a compelling
interest to justify regulations that classify on the basis of alienage. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67 (1976) (Court applied relaxed scrutiny in upholding the validity of a federal medical
insurance program that conditioned an alien's eligibility for participation on the satisfaction
of a durational residency requirement, but imposed no similar burden on citizens).
41. See 432 U.S. at 12.
42. See note 32 supra.
43. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (Court invalidated provisions of the
Arizona welfare laws that conditioned receipt of benefits upon citizenship and durational
residency requirements).
44. See notes 29 and 32 supra.
45. See note 3 supra.
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alienage to the suspect class status is apparently different from that
which justifies affording a suspect class status to other minority
groups. Although strict scrutiny application is limited to those sta-
tutory classifications that infringe upon the rights of a "suspect
class,"" exactly what causes a classification to be characterized as
suspect has never been fully explained by the Court, although a
number of suggestions have been posited. 7 Perhaps the paramount
reason that certain classifications are characterized as suspect
emerges from the recognition that certain discrete and insular mi-
norities'8 bear an immutable characteristic or trait that is beyond
the power of the included members to control or change. Skin color
and lineal ancestry are clear examples of immutable characteristics
borne by minorities that warrant the application of strict scrutiny
to classifications based on race 9 and national origin. 0 In both in-
stances, the disability attaches at birth and is not within the control
of the individual.
On the other hand, the distinguishing class character trait of
aliens is not one that attaches at birth and remains unalterable
throughout the lifetime of the individual. Rather, the immutable
characteristic warranting the elevation of alienage-based classifica-
tions to the suspect category has traditionally been traceable to the
residency requirement that aliens must fulfill before becoming eligi-
ble for citizenship.5 When viewed in this light, aliens are a prime
46. Strict scrutiny is also applicable when state legislation infringes upon certain interests
deemed to be fundamental under the Constitution. For example, in the areas of voting,
interstate travel, procreation, and privacy, the Court will require that the state show a
compelling and overriding interest to justify a dilution on infringement of these fundamental
interests. See Canby, The Burger Court and the Validity of Classifications in Social Legisla-
tion: Currents of Federalism, 1975 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1, 7. However, the Court has held that
education is not a fundamental interest. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973).
47. See Coven & Fersh, supra note 39, at 876.
48. See note 28 supra.
49. That racial classifications are afforded a suspect class status may also be explained
by reference to the historical basis of the fourteenth amendment. See Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967) (the clear and central purpose of the fourteenth amendment was to eliminate
all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination).
50. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (distinctions between citizens
solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institu-
tions are founded upon the doctrine of equality).
51. It has also been suggested that the reason alienage classifications are characterized
as suspect emerges from a recognition that they are a politically impotent and disadvantaged
minority who have no voice in the political process and no hope of effecting the desired change
through the legislative body. See Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82
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example of a discrete and insular minority during the period that
they remain ineligible for citizenship. 5 However, by enacting legis-
lation that enables aliens to participate in state funds during the
period that they remain ineligible for citizenship, the legislature has
drawn the classification in such a manner that the infirmity justify-
ing the application of strict scrutiny has been removed. Mauclet is
a clear illustration.
In Mauclet, the availability of assistance funds was not condi-
tioned upon any status or class trait that the included members
were powerless to change, but.rather upon a choice that was within
the appellees' discretion to freely exercise. The appellees had the
means available, at all times, to remove the disability and reap the
benefits of the state assistance programs;53 they flatly refused to do
so.5' Therefore, simply because the group required to make the
choice is aliens should not mandate application of the strict scrutiny
reviewing standard absent the infirmity that warrants the elevation
of alienage classifications to the suspect level. Consequently, the
statute in Mauclet should have been viewed from a different
perspective.
Perhaps judicial development of a more open-ended and flexible
test for assessing equal protection challenges by aliens would facili-
tate elimination of mechanical, facial applications of reviewing
standards to state legislation in this area. Of paramount importance
is the recognition that any equal protection analysis should begin
with a preliminary examination of the challenged legislation that
focuses on determining if the statute actually creates a suspect clas-
sification. In accordance with this approach, the Court should es-
tablish clear and precise guidelines on criteria that explain what
causes alienage classifications to be characterized as suspect. 5  Un-
Hqav. L. Rav. 1065, 1125 (1969). This argument, however, encounters certain structural
difficulties in a situation like Mauclet where the appellees have voluntarily waived recourse
to the political process by freely choosing to retain foreign citizenship. Further, there is
apparently little justification, in a majoratarian democracy, for a minority group's resort to
the courts every time the majority makes a decision adverse to the minority's interests. See
id. at 1126.
52. See note 29 and text accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
53. See note 3 supra. Section 661(3) permits resident aliens to become entitled to benefits
either by becoming citizens or by declaring an intention to become a citizen as soon as
possible.
54. See 432 U.S. at 4-5.
55. Concluding that the class is suspect because an example of a discrete and insular
minority, without clearly defining the indicia of suspectness, merely results in semantic
circumvention of the foremost issue that the Court should address.
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less the particular statute in question creates a class whose individ-
ual members are burdened by all those disadvantages that have
culminated in characterizing the class as suspect, the class is not
truly one deserving the broadest degree of protection guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment.
Therefore, the decision to employ a particular test for reviewing
alienage-based state statutory schemes should be a conclusion, ar-
rived at after a preliminary examination of how the statute operates
in creating the classification, rather than the starting point for anal-
ysis.56 It necessarily follows that strict scrutiny should apply only if
the preliminary inquiry discloses that the statutory scheme in ques-
tion creates a true suspect class. If, on the other hand, the prelimi-
nary inquiry reveals that no suspect class has been created accord-
ing to the guiding criteria, but rather that the statute classifies in a
manner that avoids the underlying reasons for strict scrutiny appli-
cation, the Court should employ a test that requires the state to
show something more than a rational relationship57 between the
legislation and the underlying state objectives." Such a test would
enable the Court to balance and weigh the competing interests in-
volved without the requirement that it find a compelling state inter-
est.59 It would also preclude the Court from exercising its creativity
in developing conceivable purposes for the classification or imagin-
ing facts which would sustain the rationality of the classification. 0
In the final analysis, perhaps the greatest significance of the
56. In general, the outcome of equal protection cases is predicated upon the standard that
the Court determines it will employ to review the challenged statutory scheme. See Equal
Airspace, supra note 7, at 418. It is therefore critically important for the Court to undertake
the task of the preliminary inquiry to ensure that state legislation is not subjected to strict
scrutiny even in those instances where no suspect class is created.
57. Justice Rehnquist, however, apparently assumes that the only alternative to strict
scrutiny is the minimal scrutiny standard. See 432 U.S. at 21. See also Weber v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 177-82 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
58. For a list of alternative reviewing standards espoused by various commentators, see
note 39 supra. See also San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 98-133 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
59. See Coven & Fersh, supra note 39, at 878-84. For example, state statutory schemes
that limit the opportunity for resident alients to engage in certain occupations or professions
would require a greater degree of precision than statutes that impose limitations on access
to educational assistance funds.
60. Unless blatantly arbitrary and capricious, classifications under the rational basis test
will be upheld if any state of facts can be conceived to justify it. McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 426 (1961). The Court has exercised considerable imagination in attributing con-
ceivable purposes to legislative classifications. See Gunther, supra note 39, at 21.
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Mauclet decision emanates from the Supreme Court's adamant re-
fusal to apply any reviewing standard other than strict scrutiny to
alienage-based state statutory schemes. Confronted with an equal
protection challenge that could have been an ideal vehicle for artic-
ulating a reviewing standard that reflects the unique position that
aliens occupy in American society, the Court instead chose to apply
prior case law without considering the rationale upon which the
prior case law was premised. When viewed in combination with the
Court's prior decisions in this area, Mauclet imposes a virtually
insuperable burden upon states to justify any consideration of alien-
age when enacting legislation, and any intrusion upon aliens' rights
apparently will no longer be tolerated.
Lawrence J. Baldasare

